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The Joint Impact of Industry Structure And Financial Distress On Corporate Risk 




While in risk management literature, there are many studies indicating that 
industry structure and financial distress have effects on corporate hedging behavior 
individually, their joint impact, however, has never been examined. This thesis 
presents the first-ever empirical research investigating the joint influence of industry 
structure and financial distress costs upon corporate risk management by examining 
396 companies in the U.S. manufacturing industries with 2-digit SIC codes from 20 to 
39 over the period from 2010 to 2015. According to their financial status and the 
measurement of industry structure, the 396 companies are divided into 4 groups: 
financially unconstrained-competitive industry, financially constrained-competitive 
industry, financially unconstrained-concentrated industry, and financially 
constrained-concentrated industry. The results suggest that industry structure and 
financial distress have a significant combined effect only on the financially 
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In the current literature of risk management theory, theorists have provided possible 
answers to the hedging incentives of companies. Well-known predictive models explain that 
companies hedging decisions are motivated by reduction of expected taxes, reduction of 
financial distress costs, and risk aversion of management. These factors, however, are all 
firm-specific, that is, characteristics of individual firms in an industry.  
Recently, there is a growing awareness that corporate hedging behavior could possibly be 
connected with the degree of industry competition. In a monopolistic industry, as for example, 
the utility industry, companies would lack incentives to hedge because any cost of risks to 
which the companies are exposed could be passed on to customers, so that customers bear the 
cost shocks instead of the companies themselves. Alternatively, in a fully competitive industry, 
hedging not only could be motivated by firm-specific factors, but also could be driven by the 
hedging behavior of the other competitors faced by the company. For instance, all firms that 
buy raw materials overseas and sell products to domestic customers face foreign exchange 
risk, and the output price in the industry reflects this common risk exposure. If the majority of 
the companies hedge this risk, the output price will not fluctuate. A non-hedging company is 
exposed to the risk but will not be compensated by increasing the selling price and letting 
customers absorb the cost because the output price is stable due to the hedging conducted by 
the other companies. Conversely, if most companies in an industry do not hedge, then the 
final selling price could co-vary with the cost shock so that the profit margin of those 
companies is unaffected. It is then unnecessary for an individual company in the same 
industry to hedge because the possible increase in costs is offset by the increase in selling 
price.  
The traditional explanatory models seem to play a less important role in the preceding 
example, and it shows that it is unwise to hedge without considering market conditions. This 
is considered as the “market side” of corporate risk management. There is a growing but 
limited number of papers that have studied this. My thesis analyses the effect of industry 
competition upon risk management and thus contributes to the risk management literature on 
this topic.  
By examining the United States manufacturing industries with 2-digit SIC codes from 20 to 
39, this thesis focuses on the joint impact of industry structure and financial distress costs 
upon corporate hedging behaviors. The sample companies could be divided into four groups, 
based on their leverage ratios and the values of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: financially 
unconstrained companies in competitive industries, financially constrained companies in 
competitive industries, financially unconstrained companies in concentrated industries, and 
financially constrained companies in concentrated industries. As it is shown in later sections, 
the empirical results indicate that industry structure and financial distress costs have 
significant joint impact only on financially constrained companies in competitive 
manufacturing industries.  
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2. Literature Review of Corporate Risk Management  
A. Theoretical Research 
A large number of previous papers on corporate risk management focus on why companies 
hedge. Although the Modigliani-Miller paradigm implies no relationship between risk 
management and firm value, Smith and Stulz (1985) note that when hedging costs are low or 
negligible, the risk management of firms that tend to maximize firm-value could be most 
likely motivated by three factors: taxes, financial distress, which is costly to firms, and 
managerial risk aversion that represents a concave expected utility function of managers. 
However, they also point out that whether companies hedge or not also depends on hedging 
costs. Companies can benefit from hedging if hedging costs do not exceed the benefits or if 
transactions costs are negligible. Otherwise, companies may not hedge at all.  
Mayers and Smith (1982) find that the purchase of insurance contracts, which serves as 
another tool of hedging, could also lower corporate tax liability and bankruptcy costs. 
Additionally, they argue that the insurance coverage required by debt covenants cause 
companies to engage in investment projects with low risk and positive net present value, thus 
helping to increase firm value and protecting the debt-holders. Lessard (1991) argues that 
hedging increases firm values by reducing the variability in internal cash flows, thus reducing 
the fluctuation in external financing needed and in potential promising investment 
opportunities. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) show that the construct of an optimal 
hedging strategy depends on the correlation between corporate cash flows and future available 
investments and usable external funds, and that options prove to be more effective hedging 
instruments than futures and forward contracts. Using an information asymmetry model, 
Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) suggest that hedging highlights a critical difference between 
managers with higher abilities and those with lower abilities, and that it is used by more 
capable managers to bring more stable and higher profits to firms. Leland (1998) theorizes 
that larger costs of bankruptcy caused by default on debts magnify greater hedging benefits, 
while hedging benefits are negatively related to agency costs caused by asset substitutions, 
that is, lower agency costs usually induce greater hedging benefits. Table 1 summarizes the 
















Smith and Stulz 
(1985) 
taxes 
 Hedging could reduce tax burden of companies, and 
thus increase firm value 
financial distress costs 
 Financial distress is costly for companies, possible 
negative outcomes could be bad credit ratings, 
bankruptcy costs, less favorable credit from suppliers, 
and so on. Hedging could relieve companies of these 
costs 
managerial risk aversion 
 If managers are risk averse, the maximization of their 
utility functions require that they bear no risk unless 
there is an extra reward for doing so 
hedging costs 
 Companies hedge when hedging costs do not exceed 
hedging benefits, otherwise, hedging may not be used. 
Mayers and Smith 
(1982) 
insurance contracts 
 Compulsory debt covenants cause companies to 
engage in certain low risk investment projects 
 The purchase of insurance policies could reduce 
bankruptcy costs and expected tax liability 
Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein (1993) 
Lessard (1991) 
corporate internal funds 
 Hedging could make companies' internal funds less 
variable, inducing a lesser extent to which companies 






 Hedging is used by more capable managers to 
produce high profits and strengthen their reputations, 
while less capable managers are unable to realize 
benefits from hedging. 
Leland (1998) 
bankruptcy costs 
 Larger costs of bankruptcy caused by default on debts 
give companies stronger incentive to take advantage of 
hedging 
agency costs 
 Lower agency costs caused by asset substitutions 
make hedging benefits greater 
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B. Empirical Literature  
Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) examine two companies in the gold industry, of which one 
aggressively hedges, while the other that does not hedge at all. Their conclusions are 
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature. Why companies hedge and the 
heterogeneity in their hedging strategies may be attributed to their different abilities to adjust 
operating cash flows when in the gold price increases; to the demands for investment capital 
when the gold price changes; and to managerial incentives, i.e., whether the compensation of 
managers is based on the firm’s market value or on profit. Mian (1996) obtains evidence that 
contrasts with the predictions made by financial distress models of hedging, and mixed results 
from the viewpoint of taxes, external funding costs, and contracting costs. By studying the 
North American gold mining industry, Tufano (1996) finds evidence supporting the theory of 
managerial risk aversion, under which managers who own more of the companies’ stock tend 
to manage risks more, while the theories of shareholder wealth maximization are unsupported. 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), however, present results that match the predictions of the 
theoretical literature, that is, companies that choose to hedge indeed have convex tax 
functions, depend less on external funds, and have better abilities to take advantage of 
potential investment opportunities.     
C. Literature Review: The “Market Dimension” of Risk Management  
Compared with the traditional risk management literature, theoretical papers and empirical 
ones on corporate hedging motives under the impact of market structure are few in number.  
C.1 Current Developed Theories On Market Structure and Risk Management 
By examining the hedging incentives of non-financial companies within an equilibrium 
setting, Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) not only state that the heterogeneity in corporate 
risk management could be explained by the number of companies in an industry, demand 
elasticity, and the convexity of production costs, but explain how the hedging decisions of 
firms could depend on those of their competitors. In their paper, the industrial equilibrium 
price is considered to be a function of the aggregate of investment and hedging decisions. 
Firms could gain more from additional investment if the other firms in the same industry 
invest less, implying that this fact could motivate firms to hedge in order to have more funds 
available when other firms are financially constrained. In other words, the risk management 
incentive of companies increases if their competitors choose not to hedge. By following their 
models, the authors also predict that the more competitive the markets are, the more 
heterogeneity remains in corporate hedging decisions.  
Mello and Ruckes (2005) investigate corporate hedging behavior by building a duopoly 
model in which external financing is expensive. First, they suggest that hedging has two 
unique effects: one is to stabilize corporate internal funds, which has been discussed much in 
the previous literature, while the other is characterized as being “strategic”. A company 
having more than enough internal funds can “prey” on those companies that are financially 
constrained by using an aggressive product market strategy, implying that the company is 
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exposed to certain risks. If the strategy works, a potential increase in market share could be 
achieved, and this in turn strengthens the company’s future financial position. Thus, in the 
case of strategic hedging, it is not the most ideal to implement a complete hedge. Second, they 
conclude that oligopolistic firms tend to hedge less when their financial situations are similar 
to those of their competitors. In addition, they present several testable implications of this 
topic from their models: (1) the more aggressively their competitors behave in business, the 
less hedging the oligopolistic companies use, implying that these companies face greater 
exposure. This behavior is consistent with the empirical findings of Williamson (2001). As 
Mello and Ruckes (2005) explained, one single company’s exposures depend on those of 
other companies, and it is not optimal to completely hedge. The hedging strategies of its rivals 
should be considered when a company makes its own hedging decisions; (2) if their final 
output products are more homogeneous, meaning more product substitutes, the oligopolistic 
companies hedge less; (3) within oligopolistic industries in which higher operating leverage 
exists, the companies tend to hedge less; (4) oligopolistic companies hedge less if external 
financing is less costly.  
C.2 Empirical Research On Market Structure and Risk Management 
Unlike the empirical studies of risk management theories that found mixed results, a high 
degree of uniformity is exhibited by results of empirical studies on the relationship between 
industrial structure and hedging. The results indicate that corporate hedging strategies are 
interdependent within industries. 
C.2.1 Supporting Evidence For The Market Structure Factor 
The impact of the competitive market structure on risk exposures was originally 
analyzed by Campa and Goldberg (1995). The market structure is measured by the 
price-over-cost markup1 and risk exposure is captured by the pass-through effect of exchange 
rate changes on corporate investments: the exchange rate exposure is reflected in the 
profitability of companies, which in turn affects companies’ future investment decisions. The 
empirical results show that in durable goods sectors with stable markups, the pass-through 
effect is highly significant while in sectors of non-durable goods with variable markups, no 
significant effect is found. Thus, they argue that the industrial structure could be related to 
corporate hedging responses. 
Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) create a theoretical model in which companies import from 
foreign companies in order to make their final products and then sell them overseas and 
domestically. They identify three factors which impact exchange rate risk exposures, and 
empirically test the model predictions. The three factors are: (1) the competitive structure of 
the output markets; (2) the combined interaction of the competitive structure of the export 
market and the export share; (3) the combined interaction of the competitive structure of the 
import market and the import share. With the price-over-cost markup as the proxy for 
                                                             
1 the price-over-cost markup is expressed as: 
sinventorie + sales of values




industrial competitiveness and a sample of U.S. manufacturing companies, the empirical 
evidence from the data matches the prediction: In low markup industries (competitive 
industries), companies’ stock returns exhibit large exchange rate exposures, which could 
cause companies to hedge; in high markup industries (oligopolistic ones), the opposite 
situation holds.  
Allayannis and Weston (1999) and Adam and Nain (2013) both conclude that the industrial 
structure is an important factor affecting the extent to which companies hedge within the 
industries. Allayannis and Weston (1999) conduct an empirical research on the interaction 
between the industry structure and corporate hedging behaviors by studying the usage of 
currency derivatives of 916 large U.S. companies from 1994 to 1995. They conclude that 
companies in more competitive industries are more likely to use currency hedging, while the 
situation is the opposite in more oligopolistic industries because the risk exposure costs could 
be passed on through pricing power. With the data on the usage of foreign currency 
derivatives of US firms, Adam and Nain (2013) find a negative correlation between the 
number of companies hedging foreign currency risks and the degree of competition. They 
wrote: “When competition is strong firms may refrain from hedging their FX risks in order to 
gain a strategic advantage when prices move in their favor”, which is consistent with the 
strategic hedging motives proposed by Mello and Ruckes (2005). 
C.2.2 Supporting Evidence For The Interdependence Among Corporate Hedging 
Strategies 
The empirical results of Nain (2004) on the currency hedging of US publicly held firms 
indicate that the firm value of those companies which remain unhedged falls when the 
majority of their competitors choose to hedge currency exposure, and that the interdependence 
between the hedging behavior of competitors in the same industry provides more explanatory 
power for corporate hedging behavior than the firm-specific characteristics addressed by the 
earlier literature. This is consistent with the viewpoint of Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) 
that the output price is sensitive to the aggregate of industrial hedging.  
Besides the findings mentioned in the previous section, Adam and Nain (2013) reach a 
similar conclusion, that the foreign exchange risk exposure decreases if the company follows 
hedging strategies similar to those of the majority of its competitors, while this exposure 
increases if the company acts differently. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses  
The risk management literature confirms that the market structure and the probability of 
financial distress are factors which affect the hedging decisions of companies, but these two 
factors are examined individually. Therefore, it gives rise to the following two questions: (1) 
Could companies act differently in theory when the two factors are studied together, or could 
there exist a combined impact of the two factors on corporate hedging behavior? (2) If so, do 
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the empirical results match the theoretical predictions? 
As for the first question, answers are offered in the current literature. Based on the work of 
Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) and Mello and Ruckes (2005), the combined effect of the 
two factors on corporate hedging behavior is presented in Table 2.  
Based on the previous theoretical predictions in section C, there are the following 4 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: in competitive industries, financially unconstrained firms have strong 
incentives to hedge. 
Hypothesis 2: in competitive industries, financially constrained firms are motivated to 
remain unhedged. 
Hypothesis 3: in imperfectly competitive industries, financially unconstrained firms tend to 
hedge less. 
Hypothesis 4: in imperfectly competitive industries, financially constrained firms are 




















Table 2. Research Hypotheses Summary 
This table summarizes the research hypotheses of this thesis. There are 4 possible 
combinations of the two factors: high degree of competition-financially 
unconstrained, high degree of competition-financially constrained, high degree of 
concentration-financially unconstrained, and high degree of concentration-financially 
constrained, and they represent state 1, state 2, state 3, and state 4, respectively.  
In state 1, according to Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007), the equilibrium 
market price is a function of the aggregate of investment and hedging decisions. 
When firms experience shortfall of cash flows, they will invest less. This condition 
makes financially unconstrained companies gain more benefits from additional 
investment. Thus, financially unconstrained companies will be motivated to hedge in 
order to have stable cash flows to take advantage of this situation.   
In state 2, with the presence of unconstrained firms that invest more, the industrial 
equilibrium price is made less sensitive to cash flow shocks, which implies that 
constrained firms face less exposure. So, a stronger incentive is given to constrained 
firms to remain unhedged. The two states again show that a more competitive 
structure makes corporate hedging moves interdependent.  
According to Mello and Ruckes (2005), in imperfectly competitive industries, 
companies with rich internal funds tend to hedge less in order to gain a financial 
advantage over those financially constrained companies, which is the "strategic" case 
of hedging and is state 3.  
Also, they predict that the firms will hedge less if the costs of financing externally 
are small, or if the companies tend to hedge less within imperfectly competitive 
industries where higher operating leverage exists. A higher operating leverage is most 
likely to cause financial distress. So, the two cases match the situation of state 4.  
  Financial Situation 
  Financially Unconstrained Financially Constrained 
Market Structure 
High Degree of 
Competition 
Hedge Do Not Hedge 
High Degree of 
Concentration 
Hedge Less Hedge Less 
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4. Data Description 
The sample is composed of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing companies with Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes ranging from 20 to 39 that are exposed to foreign 
exchange risk. The final sample contains 396 companies with no missing annual fiscal-year 
financial data in COMPUSTAT from 2010 to 2015, after excluding those with missing data in 
COMPUSTAT and those with no foreign exchange risk exposure. The total fiscal-year 
observations of the data sample are 2376. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 119 and SFAS 133 published by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) require that companies disclose whether they 
use derivatives for hedging purposes or for trading purposes. Therefore, data on foreign 
currency derivatives used only for trading purposes such as futures, forwards, options, and 
swaps are hand-collected from the 10-K filings of the companies in the EDGAR database 
Data for all the financial ratios that are used to measure the variables in the shareholder 
wealth maximization models are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database, and data on the 
variables used to proxy managerial incentives are collected from ExecuComp. 
To measure the concentration of an industry, I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
whose estimation is detailed in sub-section 5.2.2 that follows. Data on the HHI for each 
industry for the year 2012 are obtained from the official website of the United States Bureau 
of the Census, which is required by the U.S. Constitution to regularly conduct a population 
and economic census every 5 years. 
Table A.2 in Appendix A displays an example of the data that I collected. The table reports 
the data over the period from 2010 to 2015 on one company: Conagra Foods(Ticker Symbol: 
CAG). 
5. Research Methodology  
The first step is to address the company’s decision to hedge or not. To estimate the 
probability that a company hedges its exposure, I follow the model of Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand (1997). The model is a logit regression model, and there are two sets of factors that 
affect corporate hedging decisions: (1) the combined impact of the industrial structure and the 
financial situation on selected companies; (2) the earlier predicted incentives for companies to 
hedge, which are the control variables in the model.  
The next question that is addressed, is, if a company is motivated to hedge, how much will 
it hedge? In order to estimate how companies adjust their degree of hedging, both an ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS) and a 2 stage least squares regression (2SLS) are conducted. A 
2SLS approach is used in order to address the possible endogenous relationship between the 
magnitude of hedging and the corporate financial situation.   
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5.1 The Models 
5.1.1  Model of The Hedging Decision 
First, a logit regression model is run to examine the interactive effect of the industrial 
structure and the corporate financial situation on the probability that companies choose to 
hedge. The description of the model is presented as the following: 



































Where exp stands for the exponential function, and HEDGEi is the binary dependent 
variable, which indicates whether the ith company in the mth industry chooses to hedge or not. 
HEDGEi is equal to one if the ith company utilizes foreign currency derivatives such as 




HHI is a variable which 
incorporates the interaction between competition and financial distress, where HHIm is an 
estimate of the degree of competition in the mth industry, and FSi is an estimate of whether or 
not the ith company in the mth industry is in financial distress. 
The remaining terms in the model are the N number of control variables that measure the 
earlier corporate hedging incentives offered in the previous research, and the error term. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in section 5.2. 
5.1.2  Models of The Degree of Hedging 
Secondly, an OLS regression and a 2SLS regression are run to determine the relationship 
between the magnitude of hedging and the combined impact of the industry structure and the 
financial situation, the latter since the degree of hedging and the financial situation could be 
endogenous. While previous theoretical studies suggest that financial distress costs could 
motivate companies to hedge, empirical studies have investigated if the extent of hedging in a 
company in turn could influence its financial situation. The results, however, are mixed. By 
implementing the instrumental variable approach, Magee (2013) concludes that the extent of 
hedging, which is estimated by the usage of foreign currency derivatives, and the probability 
of financial distress, which is proxied by the leverage ratio, are endogenous because the more 
a company hedges its foreign currency risk, the less likely a company is found to experience 
financial constraints. In contrast, by studying the hotel industry, Tang and Jang (2009) test the 
endogeneity of the degree of hedging and leverage by implementing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test and do not find evidence supportive of endogeneity of these variables. 
If the degree to which a company hedges and financial distress are not endogenous, an OLS 
regression model is appropriate. A model that is employed is the following: 
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INCHEDGE   
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Where INCHEDGEi is the dependent variable measuring the degree of hedging of the ith 




HHI  is the interactive variable, which proxies for the 
interaction between competition and financial distress. The third term represents the N 
number of control variables that are explained in detail in section 5.2.3. The last term in the 
equation is the error term.   
Regarding the 2SLS regression used to address the possible endogeneity effect, I follow the 
2SLS model of Tang and Jang (2009), which has the following form: 
 
(3)      543210 ii ROACASHEVOLGWFIXFS    















Where the equation (3) is a regression equation of the variable FSi on the instruments of FSi. 
According to Tang and Jang (2009), whether a firm is financially constrained could be 
estimated by the following factors: 
(1) The amount of fixed assets. This factor is estimated by the variable FIX, and FIX is 
defined as the ratio of total property, plant and equipment (PP&E) to total assets. Tang and 
Jang (2009) states that companies with a high level of property, plant and equipment use more 
long-term debt to finance fixed assets, so the effect of this variable on the dependent variable 
is expected to be positive. 
(2) Growth opportunities. This factor is estimated by the variable GW, and GW is defined 
as the market-to-book ratio (MB ratio). According to Tang and Jang (2009), future earnings 
reflect a company’s growth opportunities. Because the market value indicates both the net 
worth of a company and its future earnings, the MB ratio serves as the “current expectation of 
the company’s future growth opportunities to the book value.” In addition, Tang and Jang 
(2009) also argue that companies with good growth opportunities tend to maintain a lower 
level of liabilities because a high degree of liabilities not only transfer more control to 
creditors, who could force companies to reject potentially profitable investment projects, but 
also causes more debt payment that drains companies’ internal funds. So the impact of this 
variable is expected to be negative. 
(3) Earnings volatility. This factor is estimated by the variable EVOL, and EVOL at time t is 
defined as the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) during a 
5-year-period prior to the time t. Intuitively, a higher volatility of earnings induces 
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expectations of greater uncertainty, and greater uncertainty further induces a high probability 
of financial distress. Thus, the impact of this variable should be negative. 
(4) Agency costs. This factor is estimated by the variable CASH, and CASH is defined as 
the ratio of total cash flow to total assets. Tang and Jang (2009) suggest that when obtaining 
enough free cash flow, a conflict of interest exists between management and shareholders 
over what sort of dividend policy should be executed. In order to minimize the potential 
agency costs, shareholders will make outside creditors such as banks more involved in the 
business by absorbing more debt, so these institutions will help monitor management behavior. 
Thus, this variable is predicted to have a positive effect on the usage of debt. 
 (5) Profitability. This factor is estimated by the variable ROA, and ROA is defined as the 
return on assets. ROA is expressed as the ratio of net income to total assets. Tang and Jang 
(2009) expects this variable to have a negative effect because companies with higher 
profitability have more internal funds, so it is less necessary for them to rely on external 
financing such as debt. Table 3 presents the summary of the definitions of the independent 
variables used to conduct the analysis of equation 3. 
In order to conduct two stage least squares regression, the first step is to estimate the first 
stage equation (3). Using the annual leverage ratio data of all 396 companies over the period 
2010 to 2015, FSi is regressed on the exogenous variables FIX, GW, EVOL, CASH, and ROA, 
and thus the fitted values of the the independent variable FSi are obtained for each firm from 
2010 to 2015. The next and also the final step is to run the second stage regression equation 
(4), with the fitted values of 

iFS in place of the independent variable FSi. The equation (4) is 





HHI and the control variables that are uncorrelated with the random error terms, and the 
second part is random error terms. The next section presents a detailed definition for the 










Table 3. Summary Of Variables Used In Regression Equation 3 
  This table summarizes the descriptions of the variables in equation 3. The Variable 
column shows each independent variable. The “Symbol” column presents their symbols 
in the regression. The Measurement column shows how these variables are estimated, 
and the last column shows the expected signs of their coefficients in the regression 
equation. "+" means a positive sign and "—" means a negative sign. 
Variable Symbol Measurement 
Expected Sign 
of Coefficient 
Fixed assets FIX PP&E / total assets + 
Growth opportunities GW 
Firm's market value / firm's book 
value 
— 
Earnings volatility EVOL Standard deviation of EBIT — 
Agency costs CASH Total cash flow / total assets + 
Profitability ROA Net income / total assets — 
 
5.2 The Model Variables 
5.2.1 The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable HEDGE in equation (1) is a binary 0-1 variable constructed to 
measure the hedging decisions made by the companies. Specifically, the variable is equal to 
one if companies utilize foreign currency derivatives such as forwards, futures, and options, 
and is equal to zero otherwise. The use of foreign currency derivatives is a good proxy for the 
hedging decision because not only is it considered representative in terms of corporate 
hedging strategies, but also foreign exchange risk is a common risk faced by both 
multinational companies and domestic companies in the context of globalization.  
The dependent variable INCHEDGE in equations (2) and (4) represents the degree of 
hedging by a company. This variable is estimated by the ratio of the notional value of foreign 
currency derivatives to total assets for each individual company. 
5.2.2 The Combined Impact Variable 




HHI , is composed of two elements: the degree of market 
competition (HHI) and the financial situation of each individual firm (FS).  












Where N stands for the total number of companies in an industry, and MSi refers to the 
market share of company i. A general rule used to classify industrial structure is: if the HHI of 
an industry is less than 1500, then this industry is considered to have a competitive industrial 
structure; if the HHI ranges from 1500 to 2500, this implies an industry with moderate 
concentration; if the HHI is higher than 2500, this indicates a highly concentrated industry.  
Second, whether a company is financially constrained or not is measured by the leverage 
ratio. It is expressed as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and it measures both the 
company’s degree of debt financing and its capacity to meet financial obligations. The higher 
this ratio, the more likely a company will be financially constrained. 
A financially constrained firm in a competitive industry would have a low value for this 
variable; a financially unconstrained firm in a concentrated industry would have a high value 
for this variable.   
5.2.3 The Control Variables 
This section presents the control variables that proxy for the factors affecting corporate 
hedging. In Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), the following control variables are used: 
taxes, expected utility of management, agency cost, internal funds, substitutes for hedging, 
and firm size. Another specific factor having an impact on currency derivatives use is the 
foreign exchange risk exposure. Companies facing higher foreign exchange risk exposure are 
more likely to use foreign currency derivatives. 
As indicated in Smith and Stulz (1985), hedging will benefit companies by reducing their 
expected tax burden. The tax incentive is measured by the variable TAX, the ratio of the book 
value of tax-loss carry forwards to total assets. 
In terms of the expected utility of management, there are two cases that would induce 
totally different hedging behavior. If managers directly hold the shares of their companies as 
wealth, then they tend to hedge in order to reduce the volatility of the firm value because they 
are compensated based on the performance of the companies. However, if managers hold 
stock options instead, they will benefit more by increasing the volatility of the companies’ 
market values. Therefore, to measure the situation where managers hold stock, the variable 
MASHAR is constructed that measures the percentage of shares held by CEOs to the total 
outstanding shares. The situation of CEOs holding stock options is examined by building a 
variable MAOPTI where the market value of the shares that could be gained by exercising the 
stock options held by CEOs is divided by the market value of the companies.  
How the agency cost is reduced by hedging is well illustrated by the under-investment 
problem. Hedging mitigates this problem by helping companies choose the optimal set of 
investment projects. To proxy for the agency cost (under-investment), the variable AGCY is 
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created that calculates the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenses to total 
corporate sales. 
 The effect of internal funds on hedging decisions is estimated by employing the quick 
ratio (QUICK). The quick ratio indicates companies’ ability to cover short-term liabilities, and 
its detailed calculation is presented in Table 4. 
Companies could use other tools to reach the same effect derived from hedging. These 
tools, or the substitutes for hedging are convertible bonds and preferred stocks, as suggested 
by Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997). This thesis follows their logic by using the variable 
SUB, which is the ratio of the sum of the book value of convertible bonds and preferred stocks 
to total assets. 
Finally, hedging could be costly and greater foreign exchange risk exposure makes it more 
likely that companies will use currency derivatives. Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) argue 
that the cost of hedging programs exhibits economies of scale. The larger the company is, the 
more likely it will hedge because it can make good use of the economies of scale. Thus, this 
hedging cost factor is estimated by the firm size variable SIZE, which is the logarithm of the 
value of total assets. Furthermore, foreign exchange exposure is estimated by the variable 
FOEX that is equal to the ratio of a firm’s pretax foreign net income to its total sales. Table 4 
















Table 4. Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
Model Variables Symbol Estimator Data Source 
Hedging decisions HEDGE Dummy variable 
10K filings of companies 
from EDGAR 
Degree of hedging 
INCHEDG
E 
Notional amount of foreign currency 
derivatives / total assets 
10K filings of companies 
from EDGAR 
The Combined Impact Variable 







Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and 
leverage ratio respectively 
U.S. Bureau of Census 
COMPUSTAT 
The Control Variables 
Model Variables Symbol Estimator Data Source 
Taxes TAX tax-loss carryforwards / total assets COMPUSTAT database 
Managerial 
incentives 
MASHAR shares held by CEOs / total shares ExecuComp 
MAOPTI 
market value of the underlying shares of 
stock options / the market value of the 
companies 
ExecuComp 
Agency cost AGCY R&D expenses / total sales COMPUSTAT database 
Internal funds QUICK 
(cash and cash equivalents + marketable 






(convertible bonds + preferred stock) / 
total assets 
COMPUSTAT database 
Firm size SIZE log(total assets) COMPUSTAT database 
Foreign exchange 
exposure 
FOEX pretax foreign net income / total sales COMPUSTAT database 
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Empirical Results of Univariate Tests 
The original sample in this paper includes publicly traded companies from the U.S. 
manufacturing industries classified with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 
20 to 39. Some of the companies are removed from the list because they are not exposed to 
foreign currency risk or have risk that the management considers is very immaterial, and some 
firms are also deleted due to incomplete or missing data on COMPUSTAT. After the data 
screening, the sample consists of 396 companies and the total number of annual data 
observations is 2376 in the time span of 6 years from 2010 to 2015. Table A.1 in Appendix A 
reports information on the manufacturing industries and the companies that form the final data 
sample. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics on the sample such as the mean, median, and 
standard deviation of the variables used in the analysis. Among all of the companies in the 
manufacturing industries, 158 firms decided to hedge against foreign currency risk. In terms 
of the degree of hedging (the ratio of the notional amount of foreign currency derivatives to 
total assets), the mean, the median, and the standard deviation for those using foreign 
currency derivatives (approximately 40%) are 0.23, 0.12, and 1.62 respectively. In addition, 
the mean and the median of the Herfindahl Index HHI for the U.S. manufacturing industries 
are 838.62 and 617.10, implying that the industrial structure is competitive. On average, the 
companies face financial distress, because the leverage ratio that constructs the variable 
Financial Distress has a mean value of 0.53, implying both a size of debt of over 50% of total 
assets and a risk level of debt. The mean of -0.05 of the variable, ROA, further shows that the 
companies are financially constrained because this variable reflects the profitability of a 
company. The results of Table 5 seem to support Hypothesis 2 because on average, the 
companies are financially constrained and the majority of them (60%) decided not to hedge 
foreign currency risk. 
From the descriptive statistics sorted by 2-digit SIC codes in table 6, it appears that some 
empirical evidence could be found to support the four research hypotheses. On one hand, for 
firms in the competitive industries with 2-digit SIC codes of 20, 34, and 39, the mean values 
of the leverage ratio are 0.21, 0.27, and 0.14 respectively and more than 60% of the sample 
companies decided to hedge against fluctuations in foreign currency (67%, 82% and 83%). 
The industries with 2-digit SIC codes of 22, 24, 27, 29, 35, 37, and 38 have HHI values less 
than 1500, but companies in those industries, on average, experience financial distress (the 
mean values of the leverage ratio are over or equal to 50%), and non-hedgers outnumber 
hedgers in the sample. On the other hand, industries with 2-digit SIC codes of 21, 25, 26, 28, 
30, 33, and 36 are concentrated industries with HHI values more than 1500. The firms in 
industries with 2-digit SIC codes 28 and 36 have relatively better financial performance, with 
mean values of the leverage ratio of 19% and 11%. For hedgers in concentrated industries, the 
notional amount of derivatives does not play an important role in the total assets of those 
companies. For example, the highest mean value of the degree of hedging for financially 
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constrained companies is 6.17%, while for companies which have better financial 
performance, the averages of their degree of hedging are only 4.11% and 6.50%.  
Table 5. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
  This table shows the summary of descriptive statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) for 
the whole data sample. “Hedging Behavior” and “Firm Characteristics” indicate the number of 
companies that hedge and the notional amount of derivatives utilized to hedge foreign currency risk, 
and the key elements reflecting a company’s financial status, respectively. Those elements are 
collected from the COMPUSTAT database, and the unit of measurement is million shares for “Total 
Shares Issued” and million dollars for the rest. The symbol “$” refers to the U.S. dollar. The whole 
sample includes 396 companies, and the sample covers the time period of 6 years from 2010 to 2015, 
both inclusive. 
Hedging Behavior Number of companies Number of Hedgers Percentage 
Hedging Decision 396 158 39.9% 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Degree of Hedging 0.23 0.12 1.62 
Firm Characteristics Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Total Assets ($) 7346.96  890.32 30321.17  
Total Liabilities ($) 4535.00  399.79  19786.49  
The Market Value of Companies ($) 6336.14  1064.04  21384.32  
Total Sales ($) 5514.34  855.91  21743.29  
Total Shares Issued 161.48  57.80  411.44  
EBIT ($) 592.64  72.10  2334.67  
Firm's Book Value ($) 3144.04  459.72  13822.17  
The Combined Impact Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 838.62  617.10  801.14  
Financial Distress (FS) 0.53  0.48  0.55  
HHI/FS 2285.26  1520.10  2997.91  
The Control Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation 
TAX 1.58  0.09  7.20  
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MASHAR 0.14  0.10  1.48  
MAOPTI 0.08  0.01  0.14  
AGCY 0.07  0.04  45.19  
QUICK 1.10  0.31  2.20  
SUB 0.03  0.01  0.32  
SIZE 6.66  6.79  2.36  
FOEX 0.71  0.02  63.53  
Variables In Regression Equation 3 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
FIX 0.44  0.35  0.32  
GW 1.80  2.03  114.56  
EVOL 0.21  0.09  0.57  
CASH 0.22  0.15  0.21  
ROA -0.05  0.04  0.64  
 
Table 6. Summary of Descriptive Statistics By Industry Group 
  This table presents the descriptive statistics classified by each SIC code. Panel A include details of the 
industry structure, the number of companies that hedged from 2010 to 2015, the number of companies 
included in the sample for each SIC code, and the proportion of hedgers to the total number of firms. 
Panel B displays the values for the mean, median, and standard deviation of the main variables of 
interest that this thesis examines. “Std. Dev.” shows the values of the standard deviation. 




Industry Title HHI 
Number of 
Hedgers 
Number of Firms In 
Sample 
Percentage 
20 Food And Kindred Products 1435 12 18 67% 
21 Tobacco Products 3230 0 3 0% 
22 Textile Mill Products 429 1 4 25% 
23 Apparel And Textile Products 234 1 3 33% 
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24 Lumber And Wood Products 78 0 3 0% 
25 Furniture And Fixtures 1521 3 6 50% 
26 Paper And Allied Products 1572 5 8 63% 
27 Printing And Publishing 208 1 5 20% 
28 
Chemicals And Allied 
Products 
2307 24 55 44% 
29 Petroleum And Coal Products 853 1 5 20% 
30 
Rubber And Miscellaneous 
Plastics Products 
1888 8 10 80% 
31 Leather And Leather Products 805 0 2 0% 
32 
Stone, Clay, And Glass 
Products 
344 3 5 60% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 1520 3 7 43% 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1154 9 11 82% 
35 
Industrial Machinery And 
Equipment 
757 24 56 43% 
36 
Electronic And Other Electric 
Equipment 
3167 19 62 31% 
37 Transportation Equipment 849 17 37 46% 
38 
Instruments And Related 
Products 




658 10 12 83% 




Degree of Hedging Financial Distress (FS) HHI / FS 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
20 5.16% 1.31% 0.26  0.21  0.19  0.17  5249.07  6182.99  2452.58  
21 0.00% 0.00% 0.00  0.62  0.58  0.21  4121.57  3667.20  909.96  
 21 
22 3.20% 2.14% 0.04  0.59  0.59  0.14  766.56  616.28  545.77  
23 13.18% 11.45% 0.04  0.30  0.32  0.06  808.19  730.43  204.53  
24 0.00% 0.00% 0.00  0.66  0.56  0.09  141.16  136.17  19.35  
25 4.81% 6.66% 0.05  0.71  0.66  0.15  1355.20  1023.39  667.72  
26 3.21% 1.31% 0.12  0.68  0.68  0.12  1469.79  1267.45  518.58  
27 9.29% 6.99% 0.04  0.64  0.69  0.22  604.35  144.54  1070.13  
28 6.50% 2.18% 0.58  0.19  0.54  0.47  2382.77  1703.79  2429.38  
29 22.00% 17.00% 0.13  0.68  0.53  0.64  3632.80  1758.66  5103.75  
30 5.31% 3.50% 0.15  0.57  0.54  0.22  1651.45  1373.54  1076.85  
31 0.00% 0.00% 0.00  0.32  0.27  0.19  2882.17  2979.38  777.62  
32 0.85% 1.00% 0.01  0.64  0.57  0.24  620.28  669.59  490.30  
33 6.17% 4.06% 0.07  0.61  0.58  0.20  1835.77  1498.46  1190.22  
34 15.27% 4.20% 0.22  0.27  0.22  0.20  4771.01  4091.58  1283.55  
35 10.45% 5.34% 0.23  0.58  0.48  0.22  1257.00  1194.95  999.79  
36 4.11% 5.07% 0.14  0.11  0.34  0.50  1992.84  1470.99  1638.58  
37 20.63% 1.52% 0.25  0.79  0.62  1.24  1448.38  926.62  1471.50  
38 34.49% 23.44% 1.07  0.50  0.38  0.35  2105.30  1382.99  2252.46  
39 6.47% 4.34% 0.08  0.14  0.12  0.37  5130.18  4779.47  937.34  
 
6.2 Diagnostic Analysis of The Research Models 
Before we take a further step to the next section of multivariate tests, diagnostic analysis of 
the research models should be conducted, because the analysis helps produce reliable and 
more accurate estimates and statistical inferences. In this section, I mainly focus on the 
diagnostic analysis of the OLS regression model and the 2SLS regression model. 
6.2.1 Diagnostic Analysis of The OLS Regression Model 
Three important assumptions of the OLS regression model are examined: homoskedasticity, 
independent random disturbance terms, and non-multicollinearity of independent variables. 
The normality of random error terms is not a major issue in this research, because according 
to the central limit theorem, if the data sample is large, the t-test and the F-test is still 
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approximately effective. As stated in section 4, the total annual observations in the data 
sample is 2376. This size of data could be considered large. Therefore, I mainly focus on the 
examinations of the three assumptions above.  
Table 7 reports the test results of the homoskedasticity assumption. As it can be seen from 
table 7, the White test is used to test if the homoskedasticity assumption is violated and the 
p-value for the F-statistic is 0.9985. The p-value is statistically insignificant and suggests that 
the null hypothesis should not be rejected and the variances of the random terms are constant. 
Moreover, to check that there is no multicollinearity among the independent variables, a 
correlation analysis of the variables is run and it is shown in table 8. In table 8, the highest 
value of the variable correlation is 0.2431 between the variable SIZE and the variable QUICK. 
This result is intuitive: as the size of a firm is bigger, it is easier to cover short-term liabilities, 
and 0.2431 is not considered as a serious violation of the non-multicollinearity assumption. 
Finally, the Durbin-Watson test is employed to see if the error terms are serially correlated, 
and the results are displayed in table 9. By using the whole data sample, an OLS regression of 
the dependent variable Degree of Hedging on the dependent variables is run, and a D-W 
statistic estimate of 2.0977 based on the whole data sample is thus produced. If the D-W 
statistic is around 2, the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation of error terms should 
not be rejected. So, it can be concluded that the assumption of non-autocorrelation among the 
error terms holds for this regression. In summary, the three key assumption of the OLS 
regression model are not violated, based on the results from table 7 to table 9. 
Table 7. Test Results of The Homoskedasticity Assumption For The OLS Regression Model 
This table provides the results of the White test which is conducted to determine if the variances of 
the random error terms are constant. The null hypothesis is that the variances are constant, and the 
alternative hypothesis states that the variances differ with the values of the independent variables. The 
White test uses the F-statistic as the testing statistic. If the estimate of the F-statistic is small, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, and if the estimate is large, the null hypothesis is then rejected. The p-value 
for the testing statistic are boldfaced. 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White 
F-statistic 0.1419 p-value F(9,2376) 0.9985 
Obs*R-squared 1.2818 p-value Chi-Square(9) 0.9985 
Scaled explained SS 654.9269 p-value Chi-Square(9) 0 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
C 143.5746 93.2410 1.5398 0.1237 
(HHI/FS)^2 -3.84E-08 1.48E-07 -0.2590 0.7957 
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TAX^2 -0.0149 0.0776 -0.1925 0.8474 
MASHAR^2 -0.3163 1.7328 -0.1825 0.8552 
MAOPTI^2 -331.2848 587.6365 -0.5638 0.573 
AGCY^2 -0.0016 0.0037 -0.4399 0.6601 
QUICK^2 -0.2470 1.0470 -0.2359 0.8135 
SUB^2 -1.2076 13.6104 -0.0887 0.9293 
SIZE^2 -1.2178 1.5177 -0.8024 0.4224 
FOEX^2 0.0010 0.0023 0.4375 0.6618 
R-squared 0.0005  Mean dependent var 68.9227  
Adjusted R-squared -0.0033  S.D. dependent var 2212.1410  
S.E. of regression 2215.7690  Akaike info criterion 18.2488  
F-statistic 0.1419  Schwarz criterion 18.2732  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.9985  Durbin-Watson stat 2.0001  
 
 
Table 8. The Correlation Between The Independent Variables 
 HHI/FS TAX MASHAR MAOPTI AGCY QUICK SUB SIZE FOEX 
HHI/FS 1.0000  -0.0592  0.0019  0.0301  -0.0056  0.1168  -0.0151  -0.1063  -0.0104  
TAX -0.0592  1.0000  0.0183  0.0859  0.0186  0.0098  0.0081  -0.2600  0.0187  
MASHAR 0.0019  0.0183  1.0000  -0.0171  -0.0071  0.0100  -0.0042  -0.0640  0.0136  
MAOPTI 0.0301  0.0859  -0.0171  1.0000  0.0262  0.0339  -0.0094  -0.0979  -0.0321  
AGCY -0.0056  0.0186  -0.0071  0.0262  1.0000  0.0211  -0.0024  -0.0394  -0.1677  
QUICK 0.1168  0.0098  0.0100  0.0339  0.0211  1.0000  -0.0116  0.2431 0.0076 
SUB -0.0151  0.0081  -0.0042  -0.0094  -0.0024  -0.0116  1.0000  -0.0721  -0.0004  
SIZE -0.1063  -0.2600  -0.0640  -0.0979  -0.0394  0.2431 -0.0721  1.0000  -0.0459  
FOEX -0.0104  0.0187  0.0136  -0.0321  -0.1677  0.0076  -0.0004  -0.0459  1.0000  
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Table 9. Test Results of The Auto-regression Assumption 
This table summarizes the test results of the auto-regression assumption. An OLS 
regression of the dependent variable Degree of Hedging on the independent variables is 
conducted, and the Durbin-Watson statistic estimate is given at the end of the table and 
is boldfaced. The null hypothesis that the error terms are not serially correlated is not 
rejected when the D-W statistic estimate is around 2. The symbol “*” indicates that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. 
Dependent Variable: Degree of Hedging               Included Observations: 2376 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
HHI/FS -2.671E-08 2.512E-08 -1.0339 0.3012 
TAX -0.0083  0.0238  -0.3478  0.7280 
MASHAR -0.0202  0.1149  -0.1758  0.8605 
MAOPTI -0.7532  1.1683  -0.6448  0.5191 
AGCY 0.0273  0.0076  3.5685  0.0004* 
QUICK 0.0043  0.0811  0.0536  0.9573 
SUB 0.0369  0.5266  0.0700  0.9442 
SIZE 0.0650  0.0310  2.0940  0.0364* 
FOEX 0.0223  0.0054  4.1027  0.0000* 








6.2.2 Diagnostic Analysis of The 2SLS Regression Model 
The diagnostic procedure is similar to that of the OLS regression model, the difference is 
that the focus is on the instrumental variables displayed in section 5.1. Accoding to 
Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach by Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, the 2SLS 
estimators could be best and unbiased if the following major assumptions are not violated: (1) 
instrument relevance, (2) non-multicollinearity among instrumental variables, and (3) constant 
variance of random error terms, conditional on the instrumental variables.  
First, table 10 shows the correlation between the instrumental variables of the variable FS. 
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As it can be seen from table 10, the highest correlation is between the instrumental variable 
CASH and the instrumental variable EVOL, which is 0.0868. In addition, the lowest 
correlation is between the variable ROA and the variable EVOL, and it is -0.2805. This 
indicates that higher ROA is accompanied with lower volatility of earnings. The two limits are 
not considered as a serious violation of non-multicollinearity. Therefore, the 
non-multicollinearity assumption holds for the 2SLS regression model. 
 
Table 10. The Correlation Between The Instrumental Variables 
This table summarizes the correlation between the instrumental variables used 
to estimate FS. FIX measures the size of the fixed assets of a company, GW 
estimates the growth opportunities in a company, EVOL stands for the volatility in 
earnings, agency costs are measured by the variable CASH, and ROA is return on 
assets that indicates the profitability of a company. The highest correlation is 
0.0868 between CASH and EVOL, and the lowest is -0.2805 between ROA and 
EVOL.  
 FIX GW EVOL CASH ROA 
FIX 1.0000  -0.0008  -0.1117  -0.2133  0.0158  
GW -0.0008  1.0000  0.0014  0.0028  0.0031  
EVOL -0.1117  0.0014  1.0000  0.0868  -0.2805  
CASH -0.2133  0.0028  0.0868  1.0000  -0.1642  
ROA 0.0158  0.0031  -0.2805  -0.1642  1.0000  
 
Second, instrument relevance is a condition indicating that in the first stage regression 
equation of the 2SLS regression model, the linear relationship between the instrumental 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable should be significant. In other words, the 
coefficients in the first stage equation should be statistically different from zero. Table 11 
shows the regression results of the first stage regression equation. The results indicate that the 
coefficients of the variables FIX, CASH and ROA are consistent with the signs expected in 
Table 3, and the positive coefficients of the variables GW and EVOL are the opposite to what 
is predicted in the previous section. In addition, the regression results of table 11 also suggest 
that the linear relationship between the instrumental explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable is extremely statistically significant, as the p-value of the instrumental variables are 
0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0000, and 0.0003 respectively. Thus, it could be concluded that the 
instrumental relevance assumption for the 2SLS regression model is not violated.  
 
 26 
Table 11. The Results of The First Stage Regression Equation 
This table displays the overview of the first stage regression in the 2SLS regression 
model. This regression includes 2376 annual data observations of the U.S. 
manufacturing industries. The symbol “*” indicates that the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
Dependent Variable:FS                                       Included 
observations: 2376 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  
FIX 0.7155  0.0249  28.6897  0.0000* 
GW 0.2309  0.0278  8.2951  0.0000* 
EVOL 0.0862  0.0214  4.0339  0.0001* 
CASH 0.4959  0.0460  10.7734  0.0000* 
ROA -0.0711  0.0196  -3.6254  0.0003* 
R-squared 0.1239 Sum squared resid 426.0069 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1258 Durbin-Watson stat 2.0125 
 
Finally, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is utilized to test the null hypothesis that 
conditional on the instrumental explanatory variables, the variances of the random error terms 
are constant. As it can be seen among the test results in table 12, the p-value of the F-statistic 
is 0.9101. This p-value indicates that the test statistic is insignificant. Thus, it could be 
concluded that the null hypothesis should not be rejected, that is, conditional on the 
instrumental explanatory variables, the variances of the random disturbance terms are equal to 
a constant number.  
Table 12. Test Results of The Homoskedasticity Assumption For The 2SLS Regression Model 
This table provides the results of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test which is conducted to 
investigate if the variances of the random error terms are constant, conditional on the 
instrumental explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is that the variances are constant, 
and the alternative hypothesis states that the variances vary with the values of independent 
variables. The squared residuals are from the second stage regression equation of the 2SLS 
regression models. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test uses the F-statistic as the testing 
statistic. If the estimate of the F-statistic is small, the null hypothesis is not rejected, and if 
the estimate is large, the null hypothesis is rejected. The p-values for the test statistic are 
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boldfaced.  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
F-statistic 0.3050  p-value F(5,2376) 0.9101 
Obs*R-squared 1.5277  p-value Chi-Square(5) 0.9099 
Scaled explained 
SS 
780.6404  p-value Chi-Square(5) 0 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  
C 91.6685  107.0438  0.8564  0.3919  
FIX -99.1469  150.8554  -0.6572  0.5111  
GW 0.0537  0.3976  0.1350  0.8926  
EVOL 51.2027  83.3931  0.6140  0.5393  
CASH 36.3992  232.6118  0.1565  0.8757  
ROA -31.4903  75.3570  -0.4179  0.6761  
R-squared 0.0006  Mean dependent var 68.9199  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0015  S.D. dependent var 2212.1940  
S.E. of regression 2213.8250  Akaike info criterion 18.2454  
F-statistic 0.3050  Schwarz criterion 18.2600  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.9101  Durbin-Watson stat 2.0010  
 
Based on the test results above, the conclusion could be drawn that the assumptions 
regarding the 2SLS regression model in the research is not violated. In the next section, the 
multivariate test results from each of the three models are presented. 
 
6.3 Empirical Results of Multivariate Tests  
This section presents the empirical results of the multivariate tests. The research sample 
includes 396 companies in total, and based on the HHI values of the industries to which they 
belong and their leverage ratio, the 396 companies can be grouped into 4 categories: high 
degree of competition with financially unconstrained companies, high degree of competition 
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with financially constrained companies, low degree of concentration with financially 
unconstrained companies, and low degree of concentration with financially constrained 
companies. The multivariate tests are also run by using the whole data sample. 
6.3.1 The Test Results For Financially Unconstrained Companies In Competitive 
Industries 
The results of the logit regression, OLS regression, and 2SLS regression of the financially 
unconstrained companies in competitive industries are reported in table 13. First, panel A 
displays the results of the logit regression test that investigates the relationship between the 
probability that a company decides to hedge against foreign currency risk and the related 
motivating factors. On one hand, the coefficient of the combined impact variable is negative 
and statistically insignificant, which means that with a small value of HHI, companies tend 
not to hedge as companies become less and less financially unconstrained. This is contrary to 
hypothesis 1, so hypothesis 1 is rejected. On the other hand, the coefficients of the control 
variable firm size (SIZE) and foreign exchange exposure (FOEX) are statistically significant 
and consistent with the predictions from the previous literature (Géczy, Minton, and Schrand). 
A company is more motivated to hedge if its size increases and it receives more income from 
overseas. Second, panel B shows the results of the OLS regression with the degree of hedging 
as the dependent variable. In panel B, the coefficient of the combined impact variable is again 
statistically insignificant, but the statistically significant values for the variables MAOPTI, 
SIZE, and FOEX matches what is anticipated by the risk management literature: managers 
who hold stock options will hedge less and the larger the size of the company and its foreign 
exchange exposure, the more that managers hedge. Finally, the results in panel C are similar 
to those of panel B, and the coefficient of the combined impact variable is again insignificant. 
Table 13. The Results of Multivariate Tests For The Financially Unconstrained Companies In 
Competitive Industries 
In this table, multivariate test results of financially unconstrained companies in competitive 
industries are presented. Panel A shows the results of the logit regression test, panel B and panel C 
display the OLS and 2SLS regression results. The total annual observations of the sample company for 
the three tests are 420, and the dependent variable in panel A is the dummy variable Hedging Decision 
(HEDGE) and the dependent variables in panel B and panel C are the same: the degree of hedging 
(INCHEDGE). The symbol “*” indicates that the variable is significant at the 5% level.  
Panel A. The Results of The Logit Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: HEDGE                                                   Included observations: 420 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-value   
HHI/FS -3.786E-08 4.303E-08 -0.8799  0.3789  
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TAX -1.0218  0.4660  -2.1925  0.0283*  
MASHAR 0.0595  0.0988  0.6024  0.5469  
MAOPTI -4.0972  1.4038  -2.9187  0.0035*  
AGCY -1.6017  8.0465  -0.1991  0.8422  
QUICK -0.3293  0.2024  -1.6266  0.1038  
SUB -4.8557  3.8124  -1.2737  0.2028  
SIZE 0.1025  0.0450  2.2767  0.0228* 
FOEX 6.3005  3.1948  1.9721  0.0486*  
Mean dependent variable 0.4717  Sum of squared residuals 54.2933  
S.E. of regression 0.4605  Log likelihood -154.4160  
Panel B. The Results of The OLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                               Included observations: 420 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS 5.703E-08 8.926E-08 0.6389 0.5234  
TAX -0.0076  0.0037  -2.0593  0.0405*  
MASHAR 0.0258  0.0202  1.2768  0.2028  
MAOPTI -0.5382  0.1964  -2.7400  0.0066*  
AGCY 0.6936  0.6980  0.9937  0.3213  
QUICK -0.0554  0.0242  -2.2887  0.0229*  
SUB -0.5161  0.6847  -0.7538  0.4517  
SIZE 0.0678  0.0086  7.8639  0.0000*  
FOEX 0.3941  0.1358  2.9021  0.0040*  
R-squared 0.2261  Sum squared residuals 51.1064  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2019  Log likelihood -157.9475  
Panel C. The Results of The 2SLS Regression Test 
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Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                Included observations: 420 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  

FSHHI /
 -1.46E-09 5.00E-09 -0.2918 0.7706 
TAX -0.0078  0.0037  -2.1048  0.0363* 
MASHAR 0.0263  0.0202  1.2994  0.195 
MAOPTI -0.5507  0.1963  -2.8053  0.0054* 
AGCY 0.7603  0.6937  1.0959  0.2742 
QUICK -0.0578  0.0247  -2.3426  0.0199* 
SUB -0.5592  0.6870  -0.8140  0.4164 
SIZE 0.0745  0.0079  9.4200  0.0000* 
FOEX 0.4099  0.1346  3.0444  0.0026* 
R-squared 0.2251  Sum squared residuals 51.1709  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2009  Log likelihood -158.1146  
 
6.3.2 The Test Results For Financially Constrained Companies In Competitive 
Industries 
For financially constrained companies in competitive industries, the results estimated by 
the logit regression, OLS regression, and 2SLS regression are reported in table 14. First, the 
results from the logit regression test indicate that the combined impact variable does show a 
negative impact on companies’ hedging decisions (the coefficient is -1.789E-07 and is 
significant at the 5% level). This implies that in a competitive industry, companies are less 
likely to hedge against foreign currency risk as companies perform better financially. Thus, 
this evidence supports hypothesis 2. In addition, the coefficients of the variables TAX, 
MAOPTI, and SIZE are 0.3251, -2.2349 and 0.0524, and they are all highly significant, 
implying that companies are motivated to hedge in order to reduce tax burdens, managers 
holding more stock options will benefit more by hedging less, and larger firms are more likely 
to hedge because they have the advantage of economies of scale. Second, the OLS regression 
results suggest that the combined impact variable does not have a significant impact on the 
magnitude of hedging of a company. Among the variables, only the foreign exchange 
exposure is significant. Finally, the results estimated by the 2SLS regression in panel C are 
similar to those of panel B: only the variable FOEX is highly significant at the 5% level.     
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Table 14. The Results of Multivariate Tests For The Financially Constrained Companies In 
Competitive Industries 
This table reports the multivariate test results of financially constrained companies in competitive 
industries. Panel A shows the results of the logit regression test, panel B and panel C display the OLS 
and 2SLS regression results. The total annual observations of the sample company for the three tests are 
888, and the dependent variable in panel A is the dummy variable Hedging Decision (HEDGE) and the 
dependent variables in panel B and panel C are the same: the degree of hedging (INCHEDGE). The 
symbol “*” indicates that the variable is significant at the 5% level.  
Panel A. The Results of The Logit Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: HEDGE                                                   Included observations: 888 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS -1.789E-07 3.939E-08 -4.5422 0.0000*  
TAX 0.3251  0.0663  4.9054  0.0000*  
MASHAR -0.0072  0.0409  -0.1768  0.8597  
MAOPTI -2.2349  0.5447  -4.1032  0.0000*  
AGCY -0.8146  0.5005  -1.6276  0.1036  
QUICK -0.0286  0.0443  -0.6455  0.5186  
SUB 0.1548  0.2473  0.6259  0.5314  
SIZE 0.0524  0.0135  3.8802  0.0001*  
FOEX 0.0011  0.0018  0.6224  0.5337  
Mean dependent variable 0.3565  Sum squared residuals 230.2614  
S.E. of regression 0.4514  Log likelihood -663.3332  
Panel B. The Results of The OLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 888 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS 7.343E-08 1.3343E-07 0.5503 0.5822  
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TAX -0.0313  0.0529  -0.5925  0.5537  
MASHAR -0.0249  0.1668  -0.1492  0.8814  
MAOPTI -1.1426  2.1188  -0.5393  0.5898  
AGCY 0.0008  0.0269  0.0294  0.9766  
QUICK -0.0719  0.1409  -0.5104  0.6098  
SUB 0.1533  1.1013  0.1392  0.8893  
SIZE 0.0990  0.0594  1.6671  0.0958  
FOEX 0.0250  0.0070  3.5486  0.0004*  
R-squared 0.1900  Sum squared residuals 116543.5539  
Adjusted R-squared 0.1634  Log likelihood -4248.6489  
Panel C. The Results of The 2SLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 888 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  

FSHHI /
 1.39E-07 1.764E-07 0.7878 0.4310  
TAX -0.0353  0.0530  -0.6650  0.5062  
MASHAR -0.0268  0.1668  -0.1605  0.8725  
MAOPTI -1.1826  2.1153  -0.5591  0.5762  
AGCY 0.0002  0.0269  0.0089  0.9929  
QUICK -0.0433  0.1247  -0.3472  0.7285  
SUB 0.1572  1.1006  0.1428  0.8865  
SIZE 0.0721  0.0752  0.9587  0.3379  
FOEX 0.0248  0.0071  3.5096  0.0005*  
R-squared 0.2902  Sum squared residuals 116510.7661  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2234 Log likelihood -4248.4888  
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6.3.3 The Test Results For Financially Unconstrained Companies In Concentrated Industries 
For financially unconstrained companies in concentrated manufacturing industries, the 
estimated results are shown in table 15. First, the probability is examined that those 
companies decide to hedge when exposed to foreign currency risk. According to the results in 
panel A, the combination of a good financial status and a concentrated industry does not affect 
a company’s hedging decision. However, the coefficients, which are 0.1323 -0.1086, -3.8010, 
and 0.1288 respectively and statistically significant, of the variables AGCY, QUICK, SUB, 
and SIZE are consistent with their impacts on the corporate hedging decision based on prior 
research (again please put in the references in the brackets), except for the variable TAX. 
Moreover, as for the OLS regression results about the magnitude of hedging in panel B, there 
exists a negative relationship between the degree of hedging and the combined impact 
variable, but the variable is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 is, therefore, rejected. 
Panel C suggests the same results, indicating that the amount of hedging only depends on how 
much income is received from overseas. 
Table 15. The Results of Multivariate Tests For The Financially Unconstrained Companies In 
Concentrated Industries 
Table 15 reports the multivariate test results of financially unconstrained companies in concentrated 
industries. Panel A shows the results of the logit regression test, panel B and panel C display the OLS 
and 2SLS regression results. The total annual observations of the sample company for the three tests are 
672, and the dependent variable in panel A is the dummy variable Hedging Decision (HEDGE) and the 
dependent variables in panel B and panel C are the same: the degree of hedging (INCHEDGE). The 
symbol “*” indicates that the variable is significant at the 5% level. 
Panel A. The Results of The Logit Regression Test 
Dependent Variable:  HEDGE                                 Included observations: 672 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS -1.175E-07 1.70E-08 -6.9011 0.0000*  
TAX -0.1406  0.0588  -2.3900  0.0168*  
MASHAR 0.0104  0.0722  0.1435  0.8859  
MAOPTI 0.1036  0.6472  0.1601  0.8728  
AGCY 0.1323  0.0587  2.2560  0.0241*  
QUICK -0.1086  0.0522  -2.0802  0.0375*  
SUB -3.8010  1.1538  -3.2944  0.0010*  
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SIZE 0.1288  0.0192  6.7227  0.0000*  
FOEX 0.4803  0.2837  1.6927  0.0905  
Mean dependent variable 0.3889  Sum squared residuals 129.4024  
S.E. of regression 0.4321  Log likelihood -384.2542  
Panel B. The Results of The OLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 672 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS -9.64E-09 3.5056E-07 -0.0275 0.9781 
TAX -0.0021  0.0334  -0.0638  0.9492  
MASHAR -0.0534  0.2657  -0.2009  0.8409  
MAOPTI -0.9406  2.2169  -0.4243  0.6715  
AGCY 0.0285  0.0579  0.4926  0.6224  
QUICK 0.0824  0.1303  0.6323  0.5274  
SUB -0.0396  0.6328  -0.0626  0.9501  
SIZE 0.0303  0.0602  0.5041  0.6143  
FOEX 0.0226  0.0460  0.4914  0.6233  
R-squared 0.2041  Sum squared residuals 45251.6748  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2114  Log likelihood -2458.3825  
Panel C. The Results of The 2SLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 672 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  

FSHHI /
 1.39E-06 1.76E-06 0.7878 0.4310  
TAX -0.0353  0.0530  -0.6650  0.5062  
MASHAR -0.0268  0.1668  -0.1605  0.8725  
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MAOPTI -1.1826  2.1153  -0.5591  0.5762  
AGCY 0.0002  0.0269  0.0089  0.9929  
QUICK -0.0433  0.1247  -0.3472  0.7285  
SUB 0.1572  1.1006  0.1428  0.8865  
SIZE 0.0721  0.0752  0.9587  0.3379  
FOEX 0.0248  0.0071  3.5096  0.0005*  
R-squared 0.1921  Sum squared residuals 116510.7661  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2277 Log likelihood -4248.4888  
6.3.4 The Test Results For Financially Constrained Companies In Concentrated 
Industries 
The tests results about financially constrained companies in concentrated industries are 
displayed in table 16. In the logit regression test, the coefficient of the combined impact 
variable is -3.03E-07 but statistically insignificant. The variables AGCY, SIZE, and FOEX, 
however, are statistically significant and have the same expected effects predicted by previous 
research. Additionally, the results of the combined impact variable in both the OLS regression 
and the 2SLS regression suggest that hypothesis 4 is rejected, with the statistically 
insignificant coefficient of 1.777E-07 in the OLS regression test and the insignificant 
coefficient of -1.56E-07 in 2SLS regression test. 
From the results shown in table 13 through table 16, it can be concluded that hypothesis 2 
is accepted that in a competitive industry, financial constraints will make companies less 
likely to hedge, while hypothesis 1, hypothesis 3, and hypothesis 4 are rejected. 
Table 16. The Results of Multivariate Tests For The Financially Constrained Companies In 
Concentrated Industries 
Table 16 reports the multivariate test results of financially constrained companies in concentrated 
industries. Panel A shows the results of the logit regression test, panel B and panel C display the OLS 
and 2SLS regression results. The total annual observations of the sample company for the three tests are 
462, and the dependent variable in panel A is the dummy variable Hedging Decision (HEDGE) and the 
dependent variables in panel B and panel C are the same: the degree of hedging (INCHEDGE). The 
symbol “*” indicates that the variable is significant at the 5% level. 
Panel A. The Results of The Logit Regression Test 
Dependent Variable:  HEDGE                                                   Included observations: 462 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS -3.03E-07 1.75E-07 -1.7333 0.0830  
TAX -1.1403  0.6755  -1.6880  0.0914  
MASHAR -0.3792  0.2669  -1.4206  0.1554  
MAOPTI 0.3542  1.0190  0.3476  0.7281  
AGCY -49.2246  14.2563  -3.4528  0.0006*  
QUICK 1.3153  0.9584  1.3724  0.1700  
SUB 5.7303  5.3132  1.0785  0.2808  
SIZE 0.2249  0.0591  3.8061  0.0001*  
FOEX 11.5638  4.6224  2.5017  0.0124*  
Mean dependent variable 0.6091  Sum squared residuals 39.2482  
S.E. of regression 0.4569  Log likelihood -113.7589  
Panel B. The Results of The OLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 462 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  
HHI/FS 1.777E-07 7.436E-07 0.2390  0.8114  
TAX -0.0653  0.2491  -0.2622  0.7935  
MASHAR -0.0587  0.1674  -0.3508  0.7262  
MAOPTI -0.5854  0.6679  -0.8766  0.3818  
AGCY 4.3579  7.4902  0.5818  0.5614  
QUICK -0.3475  0.4469  -0.7776  0.4378  
SUB 7.2855  3.1843  2.2879  0.0233*  
SIZE 0.0023  0.0282  0.0823  0.9345  
FOEX 5.6226  2.8605  1.9656  0.0508  
R-squared 0.1547  Sum squared residuals 407.1277  
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Adjusted R-squared 0.1451  Log likelihood -351.0343  
Panel C. The Results of The 2SLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 462 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  

FSHHI /
 -1.56E-07 4.662E-07 -0.3346 0.7383  
TAX -0.0228  0.1981  -0.1151  0.9085  
MASHAR -0.0383  0.1755  -0.2180  0.8277  
MAOPTI -0.6184  0.6729  -0.9189  0.3593  
AGCY 4.7384  7.4804  0.6334  0.5272  
QUICK -0.2835  0.3884  -0.7299  0.4664  
SUB 7.4479  3.1031  2.4001  0.0174*  
SIZE 0.0133  0.0311  0.4262  0.6705  
FOEX 5.4823  2.9035  1.8882  0.0605  
R-squared 0.2550  Sum squared residuals 407.0091  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2148  Log likelihood -351.0056  
 
6.4. The Test Results Based On The Whole Data Sample 
Finally, table 17 shows the multivariate test results from the point of the whole 
manufacturing industries in the United States. As the univariate test results indicate in section 
6.1, the U.S. manufacturing industries are, on average, competitive and companies, in general, 
operate with financial constrain. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the test results in the logit 
model. In panel A, the extremely statistically significant coefficient of the combine impact 
variable is -8.217E-07 with the p-value of 0.0000, implying that companies facing financial 
distress are less likely to hedge in the competitive manufacturing industries. Other statistically 
significant variables include TAX, MAOPTI, QUICK, and SIZE. This result is consistent with 
the theoretical predictions of the risk management literature, as the factor of the tax burden 
motivates companies to hedge, managers holding stock options tend to prefer more risk, 
companies with more internal funds are less likely to hedge, and the bigger size of a company 
induces more risk management. However, results from both the OLS regression model and 
the 2SLS regression model show that the combined impact variable is not statistically 
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significant, since the coefficient in the OLS regression model is -2.671E-07 with the p-value 
of 0.3012 and the coefficient in the 2SLS regression model is 2.133E-07 with the p-value of 
0.2653. The results from panel B and panel C show the lack of a statistically significant 
relationship between the degree of hedging and the combined impact variable.  
Table 17. The Summary of Multivariate Tests On The Whole Data Sample 
This table reports the multivariate test results estimated by using the whole data sample. Panel A shows 
the results of the logit regression test, panel B and panel C display the OLS and 2SLS regression results. 
The total annual observations included in the tests are 2376, and the dependent variable in panel A is the 
dummy variable Hedging Decision (HEDGE) and the dependent variables in panel B and panel C are the 
same: the degree of hedging (INCHEDGE). The symbol “*” indicates that the variable is significant at the 
5% level. 
Panel A. The Summary of Logit Regression Test 
Dependent Variable:  HEDGE                                                  Included observations: 2376 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-value   
HHI/FS -8.217E-07 1.171E-07 -7.0183 0.0000* 
TAX 0.2697  0.0415  6.4943  0.0000* 
MASHAR -0.0211  0.0325  -0.6509  0.5151 
MAOPTI -1.6153  0.3346  -4.8276  0.0000* 
AGCY -0.0108  0.0184  -0.5882  0.5564 
QUICK -0.1246  0.0329  -3.7848  0.0002* 
SUB -0.2810  0.3075  -0.9136  0.3609 
SIZE 0.0649  0.0085  7.6045  0.0000* 
FOEX 0.0006  0.0016  0.3844  0.7007 
Mean dependent var 0.4011 Sum squared residual 495.4355  
S.E. of regression 0.4587 Log likelihood -1435.4980  
Panel B. The Summary of OLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 2376 
Method: Least Squares 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value   
HHI/FS -2.671E-07 2.512E-07 -1.0339 0.3012 
TAX -0.0082  0.0237  -0.3477  0.7280 
MASHAR -0.0202  0.1149  -0.1758  0.8605 
MAOPTI -0.7532  1.1682  -0.6447  0.5191 
AGCY 0.0272  0.0076  3.5684  0.0004* 
QUICK 0.0043  0.0811  0.0535  0.9573 
SUB 0.0368  0.5265  0.0700  0.9442 
SIZE 0.0649  0.0310  2.0940  0.0364* 
FOEX 0.0223  0.0054  4.1026  0.0000* 
R-squared 0.35073 Sum squared resid 162726.5 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31689 Durbin-Watson statistic 2.0977179 
Panel C. The Summary of 2SLS Regression Test 
Dependent Variable: INCHEDGE                                                 Included observations: 2376 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value  

FSHHI /
 2.133E-07 1.914E-07 1.1142 0.2653 
TAX -0.0086  0.0238  -0.3625  0.7170  
MASHAR -0.0222  0.1151  -0.1928  0.8471  
MAOPTI -0.7483  1.1653  -0.6421  0.5208  
AGCY 0.0273  0.0076  3.5664  0.0004* 
QUICK 0.0032  0.0751  0.0428  0.9659  
SUB 0.0349  0.5266  0.0662  0.9472  
SIZE 0.0580  0.0363  1.5952  0.1108  
FOEX 0.0223  0.0054  4.1015  0.0000*  
R-squared 0.2751  Sum squared residual 162719.8000  
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Adjusted R-squared 0.2417  Log likelihood -8347.1050  
7. Conclusion 
The risk management literature predicts that both the costs of financial distress and the 
industry structure individually impact the hedging behavior of companies. To the best of my 
knowledge, previous research has not examined the interactive effect of the two variables. 
This paper aims to address the combined impact of the industrial structure and firms’ financial 
constraints and contributes to the existing literature by conducting an empirical research on 
the manufacturing industries in the United States. 
With a data sample covering 396 companies in the U.S. manufacturing industries over the 
period 2010 to 2015, the empirical results of this thesis suggest that financially constrained 
companies in competitive industries are less likely to use risk management. Thus, hypothesis 
2 is accepted. However, the empirical evidence does not support hypothesis 1, hypothesis 3, 
and hypothesis 4. In other words, financial distress and the industry structure play an 
important role together in the hedging behavior of financially constrained companies in 
manufacturing industries with a competitive structure, but the empirical results are not 
indicative of a combined impact of the two variables on the hedging behavior of the 
financially unconstrained companies in competitive manufacturing industries and both 
financially unconstrained and financially constrained companies in concentrated 
manufacturing industries. 
Future studies could extend this research by examining other industry sectors in the U.S. or 
on manufacturing and other industries in other countries in the world. The models in this 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 Company List 
  This table presents the list of companies examined in the paper. The colmn "SIC Code" provides the SIC codes to which each company belong. The colmn 
"Industry Title" provides the descrption of each manufacturing industry. "Company Name" includes the full names of those companies. 
SIC Code Industry Title Company Name 
20 Food And Kindred Products 
Conagra Foods Inc Pinnacle Foods Inc Post Holdings Inc Pepsico Inc 
Hain Celestial Group Inc Smucker (Jm) Co Mead Johnson Nutrition Co Cott Corp Que 
Mondelez International Inc Ingredion Inc Campbell Soup Co Mccormick & Co Inc 
Tyson Foods Inc Bunge Ltd Treehouse Foods Inc Sunwin Stevia Intl Inc 
Pilgrim'S Pride Corp Archer-Daniels-Midland Co 
21 Tobacco Products Altria Group Inc Reynolds American Inc Lorillard Inc  
22 Textile Mill Products Unifi Inc Interface Inc Albany Intl Corp  -Cl A Hanesbrands Inc 
23 Apparel And Other Textile Products Bebe Stores Inc Ralph Lauren Corp Talon International Inc  
24 Lumber And Wood Products Weyerhaeuser Co Masonite International Corp Cavco Industries Inc  
25 Furniture And Fixtures Tempur Sealy Intl Inc Steelcase Inc Knoll Inc Lear Corp 
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Miller (Herman) Inc B/E Aerospace Inc   
26 Paper And Allied Products 
Schweitzer-Mauduit Intl Inc Graphic Packaging Holding Co Intl Paper Co Bemis Co Inc 
Neenah Paper Inc Avery Dennison Corp Sonoco Products Co Sealed Air Corp 
27 Printing And Publishing 
Shutterfly Inc Acco Brands Corp Quad/Graphics Inc Matthews Intl Corp 
Multi-Color Corp    
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 
Air Products & Chemicals Inc Arena Pharmaceuticals Inc Ecolab Inc Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl 
Olin Corp Compugen Ltd Avon Products Orasure Technologies Inc 
Calgon Carbon Corp Dynavax Technologies Corp Revlon Inc  -Cl A Genomic Health Inc 
Praxair Inc Fennec Pharmaceuticals Inc Terravia Holdings Inc Amgen Inc 
Minerals Technologies Inc Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics Sensient Technologies Corp Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Tronox Ltd Dyadic International Inc Celanese Corp Aeterna Zentaris Inc 
Clean Diesel Technologies Oramed Pharmaceuticals Inc Huntsman Corp Spectrum Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Chemtura Corp Synergy Pharmaceuticals Inc Koppers Holdings Inc Generex Biotechnology Corp 
Dow Chemical China Biologic Products Inc Amyris Inc Biomarin Pharmaceutical Inc 
Hexcel Corp Codexis Inc Fmc Corp Sangamo Biosciences Inc 
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Kraton Corp Horizon Pharma Plc China Green Agriculture Inc Exelixis Inc 
Albany Molecular Resh Inc Psivida Corp Rpm International Inc Wd-40 Co 
Abbott Laboratories Church & Dwight Inc Procter & Gamble Co Albemarle Corp 
Allergan Plc Clorox Co/De Stepan Co  
29 Petroleum And Coal Products 
Cabot Microelectronics Corp Chevron Corp Fuller (H. B.) Co Quaker Chemical Corp 
Chase Corp    
30 
Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics 
Products 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co Aep Industries Inc Tupperware Brands Corp West Pharmaceutical Svsc Inc 
Crocs Inc Fuwei Films Holdings Co Armstrong World Industries Female Health Co 
Enpro Industries Inc Aptargroup Inc   
31 Leather And Leather Products Madden Steven Ltd Skechers U S A Inc   
32 Stone, Clay, And Glass Products 
Libbey Inc Usg Corp Owens Corning Apogee Enterprises Inc 
China Advanced Constr Matls  
33 Primary Metal Industries 
Carpenter Technology Corp Allegheny Technologies Inc Belden Inc Materion Corp 
Ak Steel Holding Corp Kaiser Aluminum Corp Harsco Corp  
34 Fabricated Metal Products Ball Corp Bwx Technologies Inc Crane Co Simpson Manufacturing Inc 
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Eastern Co Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp Circor Intl Inc Griffon Corp 
Snap-On Inc Barnes Group Inc Chart Industries Inc  
35 Industrial Machinery And Equipment 
Brunswick Corp Cray Inc Lexmark Intl Inc  -Cl A Pdf Solutions Inc 
Toro Co Netapp Inc Identiv Inc Proto Labs Inc 
Alamo Group Inc Seagate Technology Plc On Track Innovations Esco Technologies Inc 
Manitowoc Co Viavi Solutions Inc Pitney Bowes Inc 
Zebra Technologies Cp  -Cl 
A 
Terex Corp Rit Technologies Ltd Tennant Co Altra Industrial Motion Corp 
Caterpillar Inc Radcom Middleby Corp Flowserve Corp 
Oshkosh Corp Wi-Lan Inc Dover Corp Idex Corp 
Astec Industries Inc Lantronix Inc Spx Corp Xylem Inc 
Colfax Corp Netgear Inc Johnson Controls Intl Plc Nordson Corp 
Hardinge Inc Allot Communications Ltd Standex International Corp Fuel Tech Inc 
Kadant Inc Cavium Inc Hp Inc Lam Research Corp 
John Bean Technologies Infinera Corp Super Micro Computer Inc Intevac Inc 
Asm International Nv Astronova Inc Concurrent Computer Cp Entegris Inc 
 49 
Kulicke & Soffa Industries Radisys Corp Axcelis Technologies Inc Ceco Environmental Corp 
36 Electronic And Other Electric Equipment 
Lennox International Inc Quicklogic Corp Inphi Corp 
L-3 Communications Hldgs 
Inc 
Maxwell Technologies Inc Applied Micro Circuits Corp Invensense Inc Pctel Inc 
Ocean Power Technologies Inc Power Integrations Inc Semileds Corp Utstarcom Holdings Corp 
Powell Industries Inc Mercury Systems Inc Skyworks Solutions Inc Ceragon Networks Ltd 
Eaton Corp Plc Amkor Technology Inc Analog Devices Aviat Networks Inc 
Rockwell Automation Axt Inc Diodes Inc Neonode Inc 
Allied Motion Technologies Silicon Laboratories Inc Micron Technology Inc Vocera Communications Inc 
American Superconductor Cp Oclaro Inc Microsemi Corp Magal Security Systems 
Whirlpool Corp Synaptics Inc Semtech Corp Vasco Data Sec Intl Inc 
Astronics Corp Monolithic Power Systems Inc Texas Instruments Inc Avx Corp 
Harman International Inds Sunpower Corp Cypress Semiconductor  Key Tronic Corp 
Universal Electronics Inc First Solar Inc Qualcomm Inc Advanced Micro Devices 
Singing Machine Co Inc Canadian Solar Inc Cree Inc Mitel Networks Corp 
Adtran Inc Netlist Inc Microchip Technology Inc Shoretel Inc 
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Ciena Corp Rubicon Technology Inc Qorvo Inc Calamp Corp 
Novatel Wireless Inc Broadcom Ltd   
37 Transportation Equipment 
Alcoa Inc Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc Triumph Group Inc Modine Manufacturing Co 
Paccar Inc Wabco Holdings Inc Spirit Aerosystems Inc Superior Industries Intl 
Daimler Ag Allison Transmission Hldgs Mcdermott Intl Inc Borgwarner Inc 
Toyota Motor Corp Liqtech International Inc Huntington Ingalls Ind Inc Sypris Solutions Inc 
Zap Wabash National Corp Trinity Industries Puradyn Filter Technologies 
Tower International Inc General Donlee Canada Inc Greenbrier Companies Inc Autoliv Inc 
Tesla Motors Inc Textron Inc Wabtec Corp Westport Fuel Systems Inc 
Gentex Corp Sifco Industries Curtiss-Wright Corp Polaris Industries Inc 
Lydall Inc United Technologies Corp Moog Inc Magna International Inc 
Ford Motor Co 
38 Instruments And Related Products 
Arctic Cat Inc Atrion Corp Mks Instruments Inc Analogic Corp 
Northrop Grumman Corp Bard (C.R.) Inc Telkonet Inc Non Invasive Monitor 
Orbit International Corp Merit Medical Systems Inc Rudolph Technologies Inc Cantel Medical Corp 
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Flir Systems Inc Haemonetics Corp Hollysys Automation Tech Boston Scientific Corp 
Kvh Industries Inc Misonix Inc Itron Inc Intuitive Surgical Inc 
Teledyne Technologies Inc Vascular Solutions Inc Cohu Inc Integer Holdings Corp 
Honeywell International Inc Unilife Corp Data I/O Corp Syneron Medical Ltd 
Ametek Inc Msa Safety Inc Frequency Electronics Inc Tearlab Corp 
Electro-Sensors Inc Lakeland Industries Inc Giga-Tronics Inc Nxstage Medical Inc 
Esterline Technologies Corp Wright Medical Group Nv Hickok Inc  -Cl A Cynosure Inc 
Hurco Companies Inc Reflect Scientific Inc Xcerra Corp Photomedex Inc 
Mesa Laboratories Inc Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc Teradyne Inc Accuray Inc 
Orbotech Ltd Cryoport Inc Aehr Test Systems Zeltiq Aesthetics Inc 
Roper Technologies Inc Alphatec Holdings Inc Exfo Inc Sunshine Heart Inc 
Schmitt Industries Inc/Or Osi Systems Inc United Health Products Inc Cooper Companies Inc 
Formfactor Inc Mts Systems Corp Trimble Inc Staar Surgical Co 
Bruker Corp Mechanical Technology Inc Bio-Key International Inc Avid Technology Inc 
Harvard Bioscience Inc Mikros Systems Corp Faro Technologies Inc Nanometrics Inc 
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Fluidigm Corp Mocon Inc Geospace Tech Corp Medifocus Inc 
Kla-Tencor Corp Cyberoptics Corp Flexpoint Sensor Inc Ixia 
Visualant Inc Winland Electronics Inc Sierra Monitor Corp Sirona Dental System Inc 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
Imax Corp Leatt Corp Callaway Golf Co Daktronics Inc 
Hasbro Inc Black Diamond Inc Nautilus Inc Gaming Partners Intl Corp 





Table A.2 The Data of Conagra Foods  
  This Table reports the data of Conagra Foods over the period from 2010 to 2015. The symbol “M~$” means that the unit for the variable is million dollars. The 
symbol “$” indicates that the variable is denominated with the U.S. dollar. The symbol “M” suggests that the the variable is measured in millions, and “%” shows that 

























2010 11408.7 6700.2 972.4 12303.1 817 10438.8624 567.907 11.4533 5698.1 1 81.4 
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2011 11441.9 6905.9 103 13262.6 467.9 10251.4418 567.907 10.8915 5995.7 1 86 
2012 20405.3 15042.3 183.9 15491.4 773.9 14131.7759 567.907 12.5503 7226.5 1 93.1 
2013 19366.4 14011.2 183.1 17702.6 303.1 13627.8545 567.907 12.4634 7569.9 1 103.5 
2014 17542.2 12932.2 183.1 15832.4 -252.6 16532.9951 567.907 10.5697 7438.5 1 90.4 
2015 13390.6 9595.8 834.5 11642.9 -677 20019.5705 567.907 8.4773 6209.2 1 66.7 
Fiscal 
Year 
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2010 68.7 0 1328.4 74.8 337.2 0.066 0 1.3 0.0295  1435 20 
2011 62.7 0 849.2 177.5 379.1 0.026 0 1.4 0.0277  1435 20 
2012 60.7 0 1619.9 115.8 455.7 0.052 0 1.2 0.0348  1435 20 
2013 96.7 0 1699.5 133.9 359 0.133 0 1.1 0.0353  1435 20 
2014 78.6 0 1557.2 71.1 170.1 0.185 0 0.7 0.0355  1435 20 
2015 100.3 0 1242.8 92.3 108.6 0.185 0 0.6 0.0324  1435 20 
 
